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Seton Hall Law

Methodology
Under the U.S. Constitution, emergency powers do not per se exist; therefore they must
be defined by an amalgamation of precedent. For this paper, I am focused on executive use of
emergency powers. The U.S. model for those executive powers can be defined through executive
prerogative in the form of executive orders and congressional acquiescence. In comparing the
U.S. model to nations that have adopted explicit constitutional emergency provisions, there are
several factors analyzed in this paper: 1) constitutional language or precedent 2) historical basis
for the model 3) examples of emergency power usage and 4) a summation of the advantages and
disadvantages of the model.

Introduction
At 8:46 a.m. the first tower was hit and at 9:30 a.m. the second one was hit. Fire, death
and destruction engulfed an unsuspecting New York City. On September 11, 2001, widespread
chaos ensued causing confusion throughout government. The questions of who did this and why
inevitably crossed the minds of officials. However, the more pressing and immediate question
for government officials: what do we do? The U.S. Constitution does not delegate any
emergency powers to the branches of government. As a result, from a constitutional perspective
the government is forced to delineate their own procedures in combating crisis in a sort of ad hoc
means of addressing emergencies.
While this method of combating emergencies seems inefficient and dangerous, there is a
constant balancing between security and freedom that comes into play. If government had
constitutionally embedded emergency powers, it may more easily oppress its people in the name
of security. For example, if there had been an emergency powers provision in the Constitution
during 9/11 it may have called for civil liberties to be suspended until the emergency was over.
1

But then the question becomes – when does the emergency end? In reflection of the past several
years, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed the U.S. to more
terrorist threats constituting an “emergency.” However, the conflicts were resolved years after
the conflicts began. Thus, the implication is that the U.S. was arguably in a state of national
crisis for those several years until the completion of hostilities. During this national emergency, a
number of civil liberties may be compromised or government power would be consolidated to
address the emergency. Consequently, the outcome and danger of constitutional emergency
powers is a government closer to totalitarianism rather than a democracy.
This danger is epitomized by the rise of Nazi Germany during the Weimer Republic.
Prior to World War II, Germany’s constitutional emergency powers came into effect when a fire
erupted at the Reichstag parliament building, which was alleged to be a terrorist attack. The
German government consolidated power and suspended civil liberties, ultimately resulting in the
Nazi party taking power. While it is very unlikely that the U.S. will ever reach a stage of
government oppression similar to Nazi Germany, the threat is abundantly clear that in time of
emergency a country is faced with potential abuses of power.
Accordingly, the U.S. Constitution was unique in that it established a separation of
powers. However, because the Constitution is interpretative by its nature, a blurring of the lines
between the branches of government occurs. During times of unrest a government’s ability to
respond to threats quickly is a necessity. However, the rights of citizens often act as inadvertent
obstructions to accomplishing certain national security goals. Consequently, concentrated
executive powers and limitations during times of emergency are frequently solutions to national
crisis.
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The tendency of legislative power is to be cumbersome, slow and bureaucratic. As a
result, the executive branch generally steps in to addresses immediate emergencies. While the
U.S. has a long history of constitutional tension between balancing security and freedom, other
nations have encountered similar issues generated by national emergencies. Accordingly, the
constitutional traditions of other countries acknowledge that in some situations freedom may be
affected by both foreign and domestic calamities, leading to increased flexibility of government
intervention.
Part I: Defining U.S. Emergency Powers
Original Intent of the Executive Branch
While the U.S. Constitution is plagued by numerous uncertainties of what the framers
originally intended when they drafted the document, it is clear that they intended executive
power to be a necessary evil.1 This is evidenced by their early experimentation with the Articles
of Confederation, which completely lacked an executive branch.2 In addition, to having no
executive branch, the legislative branch was unicameral and responsible for all military action
and foreign policy.3 Due to the numerous complications from the Articles of Confederation, the
executive branch was created with an emphasis on efficiency in correcting the deficiencies of the
Articles.
Alexander Hamilton, stated in Federalist Papers Number 70 stated “energy in the
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.4” This quote reflected the
Framers’ intent in that the executive branch was meant to assume a prominent role in

1

Eric M. Freeman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the
Constitution From the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation. 60 Tenn. L.
Rev. 783 (1994).
2
Id.
3
Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-10 (1973).
4
Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-2 (1973).
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government. However, distinctively absent from the Constitution is a provision detailing
emergency powers. Consequently, when emergencies occur the executive branch is one of the
best means of dealing with threats. For instance, in regard to foreign threats, the president as an
individual is generally far better able to reach quick decisions than congress. Debates and voting
with a consensus require so much time that they are luxuries, which sometimes cannot be
afforded, especially in times of military conflict. Furthermore, the President doesn’t have to deal
with the practical concerns of securing majority agreement among 535 members of Congress5.
As a result, the President was given vast powers in terms of foreign policy formulation and the
ability to address conflicts efficiently. This is particularly important, because foreign powers may
prompt military actions and consequently cause a nationwide emergency.
However, because of the danger of oppression during an emergency, the Framers had the
objective of avoiding a monarchy and sought to deny the president the British imperial
prerogative of vesting war making powers with a sole ruler. The last clause of the Constitution
Article I, Section 8 expressly prevents some of that by granting Congress the ability to declare
war.6 But interestingly enough, at the same time, command of the Army and Navy was vested
expressly with the president through the words “Commander in Chief” that is embedded in the
constitution. This meant that once congress declared war, the president in his role would carry
out this declaration in his capacity as leader.
Accordingly, the legislative and executive branches, by design, were meant to have “joint
possession,” as Hamilton would call it – in reference to the president’s ability to control matters

5

Head. “Imperial Presidency 101 - Unitary Executive Theory and the Imperial Presidency.”
http://civilliberty.about.com/od/waronterror/p/imperial101.htm
6
Id at 3.
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of war and treaty making powers.7 This joint possession of powers implies that during
emergencies, the executive and legislature would work together. But the interwoven
responsibilities between the two branches resulted in competing interests at times. However,
language in the constitution gave the president broad powers to execute the laws through the
take-care clause and the necessary and proper clause to enact the will of the legislature, this is
particularly useful when dealing with an emergency.
This language allowed the president and executive to act when the law was not written or
ambiguous8. The president, the inference is, should have the discretion to act for the public good
to protect the country. In fact, the presidential oath of office explicitly states that the president
will take all necessary measure to “preserve” and “protect” the Constitution of the U.S., an oath
that is different from that of all other federal officials.9 As a result, there is an implicit tension at
times between the executive branch acting to enforce the laws and protect the country and
legislative branch’s objective to pass well thought out legislation reflecting the will of the
people. Similarly, there is an implicit tension between the theme of freedom and the necessity of
security.
According to the prominent historian Arthur Schlesinger, the U.S. Constitution was
“established, for better or for worse, an idea new to the world in the eighteenth century – the idea
of the separation of powers.10” This illustrates the American contribution to the “art of
government” with an inherent and institutionalized conflict between governmental branches11.
But while checks and balances prevent power from being concentrated, it also prevents

7

Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: the Federalist Papers as a Political
Narrative, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 447 (1996).
8
Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency 1-15 (1973).
9
Fisher and Adler, American Constitutional Law 492-493 (2009).
10
Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency vi-x (1973).
11
Id. at 1-5.

5

efficiency. Despite these tensions and difficulties created by the separation of powers, the U.S.
Constitution has no provision allowing for exceptions during national emergencies even though
the Framers’ would have inevitably known that emergency circumstances may arise.
Based on original intent, it appears that the Framers’ intentionally left out emergency
powers and that governance during an emergency should be a joint venture. The probable reason
for leaving out such a strong power is the potential for abuse and the fear of monarchy.
Therefore, it’s arguable that the very notion of emergency powers may run contrary to the
Framers’ intent when crafting the constitution. But when abiding by a strict constitutional
perspective, the result may be detrimental to the overall nation’s well-being when threats are
encountered. Thus, over the course of U.S. constitutional history, presidents have adopted their
own methods of dealing with crisis outside of normal constitutional provisions under a theory of
implicit powers. These implied powers consist primarily of legislation and executive orders.
Executive Action and Congressional Acquiescence
During an emergency the executive may implement a number of provisions to address the
problem but these actions may be repugnant from a separation of powers perspective. This
includes the use of executive orders and congressional acquiescence of power. During an
emergency, the president may issue an executive order instructing his executive officials and
agencies to do certain actions with the full-force of law. Similarly, in the midst of crisis, congress
may see value to the executive action and may yield their authority in favor of an executive
dealing with an imminent crisis. This doctrine of “congressional acquiescence” has been
implemented by the executive branch throughout history to push the limits of executive power
during an emergency.

6

Consequently, the U.S. model in terms of emergency power is characterized primarily by
affirmative actions taken by the executive and legislative silent consent of executive actions. Few
instances in U.S. history have reached the level of constitutional crisis comparable in the
American Civil War. Constitutionally, the Civil War was a foreseeable but unique predicament
that left many more questions than answers. The nation was divided geographically and
politically with a splintered Congress and no precedent to guide government in addressing the
situation.
One of the most striking examples of a president acting to combat an emergency is in the
form of President Lincoln suspending habeas corpus.12 This prevented the accused from
appearing before a judge who would access the legality of the imprisonment. But by suspending
habeas corpus, the accused prisoner could be held indefinitely without trial. However, Lincoln’s
actions were in contradiction with Article I Section 9 of the Constitution which explicitly stated
that the right of habeas corpus cannot be suspended unless in time of rebellion by Congress13.
Lincoln thereby explicitly encroached upon congressional power on behalf of the executive
branch; this power was acquiesced by congress.
In Ex parte Milligan the ultimate issue of the case was whether or not President Lincoln,
in time of national emergency, could suspend the writ of habeas corpus contrary to the
constitution and order a military trial of a U.S. citizen.14 The Supreme Court ruled that the
suspension of habeas corpus was constitutional given the circumstances of Civil War – thereby
implying an emergency power by the executive. However, while Lincoln acted unilaterally to

12

Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12
Chap. L. Rev. 439 (2009).
13
Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency vi-x (1973).
14

Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law 267-268 (1st ed. 2007); Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. 2, 10 (1866).

.
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suspend habeas corpus, the presidential act itself was justified through congressional legislative
power later on. The Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863 was passed, which acquiesced the
power to suspend from Congress to President Lincoln.15
While the precedent of Ex Parte Milligan is limited, the implication is clear for
emergencies. The Habeas Corpus Act was passed retroactively after Lincoln suspended the right
of habeas corpus; thus the power was acquiesced on behalf of the Congress. Justice Jackson
stated in his concurrence in Ex Parte Milligan that the Constitution only explicitly allows for the
suspension of one right (habeas corpus) and thus the implication was that government is held to a
high standard in regard to civil liberties and would only be suspended when necessary.16 But as a
result, the precedent stands that when there is a legislative deficiency in action, the President
may step in and if there is no Congressional objection the President may proceed with what
action he deems fit.
However, the presidential power during emergencies is not unlimited and congress or the
judiciary may easily put a stop to executive prerogatives. When the legislative or executive
branch objects to an executive action the president is constrained. Almost 100 years after the
Civil War, President Truman attempted to seize the production operations of a number of steel
factories that were striking during the Korean War in Youngstown Steel. The court eventually
held that the President’s actions were tantamount to lawmaking, thus infringing upon the
legislative branch’s power.17.
During emergencies, congressional acquiescence presents a novel way for presidents to
maneuver constitutional restrictions in order to address national emergencies. However, when
congress does not acquiesce, the president is constrained despite the emergency conditions. The
15

Id.
Id. at 634.
17
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 579-709 (1952).
16
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decision in Youngstown Steel was in keeping with the separation of powers doctrine and the
Framers’ intent that the branches govern jointly to prevent tyranny. But in the midst of an
emergency, certain civil liberties are generally constrained.
Executive Power during an Emergency
During an emergency, civil liberties are inevitably limited to some extent in the name of
security but vary given the circumstances. A full scale war is an extreme but generally
uncontroversial category of emergency that prompts use of special executive powers. Executive
powers are generally used because they have the full force of law and allow for the executive to
act immediately. For instance, in Hirabayashi V. United States, after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
President Roosevelt issued an executive order placing restrictions on the civil liberties of
Japanese-Americans in terms of mandated time curfews to better control the movement of
possible enemy sympathizers.18 The order was upheld as constitutional where the court
concluded that the curfew was not beyond the scope of legislative/executive power in the
presence of wartime circumstances. However, due to the restraints on liberty resulting from the
curfew, it was placed under a rational basis analysis and held to be valid.
Similarly, in Korematsu V. United States an executive order was issued where all
Japanese-Americans were to be detained and put into quasi-concentration camps, under the
suspicion that subterfuge may occur from wartime collaborators of Japanese origin. Civil rights
were essentially nullified despite no evidence of crimes or terrorism.19 The court ruled that these
restrictions were to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny analysis. But given the nature of the
ongoing war effort and the threats posed by the Japanese it was believed that public necessity
fostered the need for restrictions on civil rights. The emergency powers implication of

18
19

Hirabayashi V. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 81-113 (1943).
Korematsu v. United States, U.S. 214, 214-248 (1944).
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Hirabayashi and Korematsu illustrate that there are very few limitations on executive power
when the gravity of the circumstances mandate that some civil liberties are limited in the name of
security. However, the balancing test between security and civil liberties is generally of more
freedom when the emergency is not immediate.
In comparison, the Bush Administration in 2001 in response to 9/11 worked to implement
the Patriot Act, thereby allowing for more effective combating of terrorism.20 Consequently, the
National Security Agency was authorized to monitor, without warrants any phone or internet
communication that involved suspected terrorists overseas through executive order to enforce the
Patriot Act. This patent use of emergency power as justification for infringement of the Fourth
Amendment is one of the more controversial measures of the executive.
Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld a U.S. citizen was captured in a warzone and detained
without access to an attorney and did not have any notice of any charges against him for being an
enemy combatant.21 The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the executive branch
has the authority to detain citizens who are labeled enemy combatants without civilian due
process of law. The court held that the president has the power to detain enemy combatants
because of executive war powers – therefore the initial detention was at least lawful, citing Ex
Parte Milligan.22 However, the court stated that the detained should at least be given due process
in order to challenge his detention. In addition, the court stated that there is always a fear of
vesting too much power in a single branch and the judiciary acts as a check on executive power.
Thus the implication was that even in wartime or an arguable emergency, due process and civil
liberties should be upheld whenever possible but there are situations that may mandate executive
intervention.
20

18 U.S.C. § 2331
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
22
Id. at 521.
21
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Legislative Power during an Emergency
The potential of emergency executive power is great for abuse in the American model;
there are a variety of limitations and checks on power that safeguard liberty. While, there are no
formal emergency powers in the U.S. Constitution, the legislative branch makes laws that
outlines what sorts of measures can or can’t be taken by the executive, notwithstanding
congressional acquiescence.
For instance, the Posse Comitatus Act in concert with the Insurrection Act was passed to
ensure that federal troops could not unilaterally enter a state to enforce state law and put down
unrest.23 Naturally, during an emergency assistance from federal troops under the guidance of the
executive branch may be helpful, especially in case of rebellion. However, by allowing the
executive branch power to send troops to a state gives the executive too much power especially
during an emergency; hence, the legislative prohibition.
In addition, when there is an emergency or potential emergency the legislature has passed
laws to place limit the potential for abuse. The right of privacy is typically one of the first rights
to be diminished in exchange for security. In 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) was passed to prevent the executive from trampling on civil liberties through
wiretapping.24 The act outlined a list of procedures for the executive to use when investigating
potential terrorist or criminal suspects through physical or electronic searches.
In contrast, when the circumstances of September 11th required more invasive searches
and investigatory techniques, the legislature in response passed the Patriot Act to grant the
executive more power to combat terrorism. This included provisions in the act that allowed for
enhanced domestic security, more scrutiny for financial transactions, and ultimately easier

23
24

18 U.S.C.A. § 1385
36 U.S.C.A. 36 § 1801
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surveillance procedures in contrast to the FISA Act. Thus, when the situation presented itself, the
legislature allowed for greater flexibility for the executive with fewer restraints on civil liberties.
Consequently, the implication is that even during time of emergency, rather than a
constitutional provision outlining what to do during an emergency, congress frequently adjusts
and passes legislation accordingly. This approach limits the amount of governmental interference
with civil rights, while allowing the government to implement some emergency provisions if
needed. As a result, despite the lack of constitutional mandate, the government is not limited in
addressing potential emergencies.
Part II: Comparative Perspective
German Constitutional Emergency Powers
The constitutional history of Germany parallels the United States experimentation with
executive power. While the Articles of Confederation emphasized a lack of an executive, the
Weimer Republic Constitution focused on executive power as a means to addressing
emergencies with an explicit provision in the form of Article 48.25 The article allowed the
president to use executive power to combat an emergency without legislative consent. As a result
of this narrow explicit provision, the executive was able to exercise quasi-dictatorial powers.26
Article 48 detailed that the president, during time of upheaval may use armed forces to
compel the government if it is not fulfilling its duties.27 In addition, the president may suspend a
number of fundamental rights detailed in the constitution such as habeas corpus, right to privacy,

25

Andras Jakab, German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on State of Emergency – Paradigms and Dilemmas of a

Traditional (Continental) Discourse, German Law Journal Vol.5 No.7, 453, 453-478 (2005).
26

C.J. Friederich, The Development of the Executive Power in Germany, American Political Science Review, (1933)

at 150; Jenny Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective 15 Yale L.J. 2480, 2480-2510
(2006).
27
Constitution of the German Reich of 1919, Art. 48.
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and protection against search and seizure.28 Initially, Article 48 was used to combat economic
crisis which allowed for the dissolving of the parliament and the calling of new elections in order
to get certain legislation passed.29 In addition, it was used to combat a number of small rebellions
and unrest garnered by economic depression. However, under the Nazi regime, Article 48 was
used in conjunction with the Reichstag Fire Decree to suppress dissidents and civil liberties of
citizens.30 A fire broke out in the Reichstag parliament building and was alleged to be from a
communist or anarchist insurrection, despite little to no proof. As a result, political opponents of
the Nazis were imprisoned which paved the way for the rise of Hitler.
However, under Article 48 there was a provision requiring legislative notification and
approval of emergency.31 In fact, Article 48 has many similarities with some broad emergency
powers in some modern constitutions such as Russia. But even with the legislative oversight,
dictatorial power was achieved. Consequently, the implication is that even with an emergency
power with a legislative check on the executive, power may be still abused. As a result of these
lessons, the modern German Constitution has a comparatively weak executive branch with few
emergency powers outlined for the executive. In addition, the modern German constitution is
very detailed and outlines with specificity most constitutional provisions to the point of
cumbersomeness. The level of detail is reflective of Germany’s bloody past and is intended to
avoid any ambiguity leading to the possibility of dictatorship.
In fact, Article I of the Constitution states that human dignity is the foremost priority and
the suspension of human rights is also barred to prevent future abuse.32 Power is largely vested in
the legislature, where the parliament can remove individual executive ministers and can vote out
28

Id.
Jakab at 453-478.
30
Id. at
31
Constitution of the German Reich of 1919, Art. 48.
32
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 1.
29
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the head of state chancellor through a vote of no confidence.33 This legislative emphasis is
illustrated by the vesting of war powers with the legislature, which may expedite the legislative
process during war or an emergency but must nevertheless authorize all military action.
In Article 81 of the modern German constitution, there is a power to call a state of
legislative emergency which is vests most of the power within the legislature as opposed to the
executive in dealing with emergency situation. This method of vesting the ability to call a state
of emergency with the legislature prevents abuses of power akin to Nazi Germany. Foreign and
domestic threats are constitutionally separated in a similar way to the United States. Internal
threats are constitutionally handled explicitly by German police forces, whereas foreign threats
are handled by armed forces and must be addressed legislatively. But during states of emergency,
armed forces are granted extra special domestic powers, such as the protection of private
property or perform traffic duties to the extent necessary to protect the country.34
But what is unique about the German model for dealing with emergencies is the lack of
executive enforcement with little if any involvement. The German Chancellor acts more of a
subordinate to the legislature, instead of the American President who acts in concert with
Congress. Furthermore, the detail of legislative emphasis and the lack of executive mention
regarding how emergencies should be handled in comparison to the U.S., illustrates a fear of
executive power. However, some rights are reluctantly lessened during emergencies such as
freedom of movement and right to privacy in homes may be explicitly limited during times of

33

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.115a.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 87-A (3) and (4) (“During a state of defense or a state of
tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to
the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. Moreover, during a state of defense or a state of tension,
the Armed Forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of civilian
property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.)
34

14

emergency.35 But these are very limited and the constitution even provides for a method of
redress in the event that constitutional power is allegedly abused.
Accordingly, most of Germany’s emergency power comes from legislative direction.
Article 81 details “legislative emergencies” which upon agreement of the legislature, the
president, in conjunction with the chancellor, may ask the legislature to declare a state of
legislative emergency that expedites the legislative process.36 As a result, certain pieces of
legislation may be streamlined and get through to combat the emergency. A federal chancellor
can only do legislative expediting one time per term of chancellor.
In addition, in Article 91 the German Constitution allows for the use of police force to
combat an “internal emergency.” For foreign external threats during the state of defense, the
executive is only allowed to address the problem with troops to address the problem “insofar as
necessary to combat the threat.” This threat from external forces is called a “state of defense”
and declared by the legislature and allows the federal government to pass laws that all federation
states must abide by even if power is encroached upon. In addition, the constitution only
provides for restrictions on human rights only in external emergencies, not regular states of
emergency.37 As a result, the state of defense must be declared by the legislature upon request by
the executive even if a threat is imminent. This illustrates the cumbersomeness of the model and
the merits of the American model. For example, the United States used legislation in the form of
the War Powers resolution giving legislative oversight of actions of hostility without the
constraint of a constitutional procedure. Whereas, in Germany, if a foreign threat is attempting to
invade the country a state of defense is a legislative hurdle the government must overcome

35

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.13 and 17a
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.81
37
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art.115C(2).
36
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before anything can be done. Consequently, German executive powers are best described as a
legislative centric model, as opposed to the U.S. model.
Russia’s Emergency Power
In contrast to the German constitutional model of legislative emphasis, Russia
emphasizes executive prerogative in governance. Both countries represent two extremes in
regard to how from a constitutional perspective a country should deal with a national emergency.
Russia’s tumultuous history resonates with its current constitutional model of government,
similar to Germany but from a different historical perspective. After many years of communist
rule, Russia’s current constitution delegates various powers to their executive branch. These
powers give the executive great latitude from a constitutional perspective in using unilateral
powers compared to the United States. One of the most powerful executive acts the Russian
President has is the power to declare a national emergency, as outlined in the constitution.38
However, there are a number of notable limitations on the executive that constrain it from
concentrating too much power.
One of the most powerful actions the Russian President can do is declare a state of
emergency pursuant to Article 88 of the Constitution. The language states: “The President of the
Russian Federation, in the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure envisaged
by federal constitutional law, shall introduce a state of emergency on the territory of the Russian
Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately inform the Council of Federation
and the State Duma of this.”39 As defined, the state of emergency is in place to “ensure the safety
of citizens and the protection of the constitutional order.”40 In addition, certain restrictions may

38

Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 88.
Id.
40
Id.
39
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be imposed on human rights and freedoms during the state of emergency.41 However, some
rights may not be restricted as explicitly outlined in the constitution; the right to counsel,
protections against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and habeas corpus.42 While these
limitations provide some constraint on the executive, it nevertheless is clearly the dominant
branch in the constitution.
One of the most striking executive powers outlined in the constitution is the president’s
ability to unilaterally dissolve the State Duma and call for new elections. Presumably, the logic
behind the constitutional provision is that a president needs the support of the Duma to act
efficiently with legislative support. However, during a state of emergency the constitution is
explicitly precludes dissolution of the Duma.43But this power has the potential to be a powerful
political weapon to solidify the president’s position and could be easily abused prior to a state of
emergency for the benefit of the president. It would allow the president to oust political
dissidents who would normally act as a check on executive power.
In fact, Boris Yeltsin during the early years of the new constitution of the Russian
Federation implemented those powers with great success. He dissolved the Duma for the purpose
of ousting former communists who were still present after the fall of the Soviet Union. While
Yeltsin was not nefarious in his purpose and his actions ultimately benefitted the country as a
whole, there is a great potential for abuse in the future. Hypothetically, this dissolution could
occur and the president could install his own supporters then call a state of emergency with great
executive power.44

41

Id.
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 56.
43
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 109.
44
Ara Balilkian, The New Russian Federation Constitution: A Legal Framework Adopted and Implemented in a
Post-Soviet Era, 18 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 237 (1995).
42
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The executive emphasis in the constitution is also seen through other provisions in the
constitution. For instance, if the president is responsible for misconduct, impeachment
proceedings can occur but are limited and very improbable during a national emergency. The
process begins with a vote in the legislature which is then turned over to the courts which
determines whether or not the president is guilty or innocent. Then the matter is turned over to a
Federal Council which decides whether to impeach or reject the matter. A strict time limit of
three months for an impeachment proceeding is required and exceeding that constraint will
ultimately lead to dismissal.45
As a result, it’s very hard if not unlikely a Russian President can be impeached much less
so during a national emergency. While the age of Soviet totalitarianism is over for Russia, the
fact remains that the executive branch in Russia is one of the most powerful and is capable of
doing most anything during a time of emergency. The Russian President’s executive power
during an emergency appears backward and quasi-dictatorial but at the same the power is not
necessarily unique.
The limited checks on power in regard to the Russian President are particularly important
because the executive is in control of the ministries responsible for addressing an emergency:
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense,
Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM). The Ministry
of Defense is in charge of external emergencies and combating terrorism, whereas EMERCOM
is responsible for emergencies stemming from civil defense and dealing with natural disasters. In
contrast to domestic threats, foreign enemies and threats are also addressed at the direction of the

45

Id at 257.
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president and ministry of defense, who must seek approval to institute martial law on the
country.46
However, because the Russian Constitution is broad like the U.S. model, the legislature
must fill in the gaps to address certain situations. Specifically to deal with terrorism, the Russian
government passed an anti-terror act called “On the Fight Against Terrorism.”47 The act allows
for authorities to restrict movements of private citizens when necessary and force a citizen to
show identification papers and detain the citizen until identity can be established. Some of the
more intrusive provisions even include free warrantless entrance into homes in the course of
“suppressing terrorism.” The U.S. Patriot Act pales in comparison to the provisions of the
Russian anti-terrorist equivalent. But the act is reflective of the emphasis on executive force and
efficient overwhelming use of force. Consequently, the executive-centric model on emergency
powers focuses more on efficiency and completing an objective rather than emphasizing civil
liberty protection.
France’s Executive Emergency Power
In France, the President has significantly less powers as the Russian President when there
is a state of emergency. The state of emergency in the modern French Constitution of 1958 is
codified in Article 16 of their constitution and contains some of the broadest grants of emergency
power to an executive, merely stating:
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its
territory, or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under grave and
immediate threat and when the proper functioning of the constitutional governmental
authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures
demanded by these circumstances after official consultation with the Prime Minister, the
Presidents of the Assemblies, and the Constitutional Council.48
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Despite the broadness of the article the state of emergency and subsequent actions must
be “prompted by a will to ensure within the shortest possible time that the constitutional
governmental authorities have means of fulfilling their duties.”49 Though this is open to
interpretation, it illustrates the desire to end emergency action as soon as practicable to avoid the
fear of a perpetual state of emergency and the dangers of unchecked executive power. Similar to
the Russian Constitution, it explicitly outlines that the legislature can only be dissolved but not
during an emergency. In addition, when martial law is granted by the executive, it cannot exceed
more than 12 days unless the legislature authorizes it.50
Article 16 was only implemented once in response to a rebellion in French controlled
Algeria in 1961.51 During the emergency, the president issued 18 orders of which included:
censorship in the territory, harsh punishments for rebels and sympathizers, and the use of
military courts. Since the Algerian rebellion and succession, Article 16 has not been
implemented but instead the executive branch and legislature have used normal constitutional
powers without going to the extent of a “state of emergency” in addressing national issues.
In this capacity, the executive branch issued decrees similar to executive orders using
existing legislation to justify curfews and searches by authorities. These decrees are used as
emergency powers but not widespread to the point of classifying the nation in a state of
emergency.52 Typically, these decrees are implemented via the executive branch with legislative
consent and used to quell riots and other forms of limited unrest. As a result, the decrees are
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similar to executive orders in the U.S., where the executive branch has the ability to govern its
own affairs and manage issues as they arise.
For instance, an emergency decree was issued by the French President in order to quell
strikes at oil refineries by essential workers, which resulted in a fuel shortage. The decree gave
police authority to break up the strikes; in addition force the workers to return back to work – a
stark contrast to Youngstown Steel in the U.S. The French President has also at times placed
curfews on the population in order to combat rioting and crime via executive emergency
decrees.53 Consequently, the French model is similar to the model in the U.S. with joint
possession of executive powers but with legislative oversight and a broad emergency provision.
South Korea’s Emergency Power
In keeping with the tradition of France, South Korea acknowledges the necessity of some
sort of emergency power but with legislative notification and checks against the executive.
Under Article 76 of the South Korean Constitution it outlines broad executive emergency powers
for the executive. An emergency is explicitly defined as: “a time of internal turmoil, external
menace, natural calamity, or a grave financial or economic crisis.”54 During an emergency, the
president is given power to act to maintain the public order when the legislature hasn’t had the
ability to convene.
Most startling is South Korea’s executive power in relation to national security
emergencies, which are akin to Weimer Constitutional provisions. When major hostilities
threaten national security, the President gains a quasi-legislative power in which he may issue
orders having the effect of law. The constitution limits the president in terms of this power by
specifying that the power is only allowed “when it is required to preserve the integrity of the
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nation, and it is impossible to convene the National Assembly.”55 While the president is required
to notify the legislature, this broad language is still very interpretative and resembles the Article
48 of the Weimer Constitution. But nevertheless legislative mandate is required implying
somewhat of a check on executive power and is significantly less powerful than previously.56
However, the somewhat cautious language of the constitution is reflective of its
emergency powers in their earlier constitutions. South Korea in its young history has gone
through a total of six constitutions due to political and military overthrows of government
abusing the constitutional power of emergency. In the first South Korean Constitution,
emergency powers were also in place but like so many other constitutions the executive abused
that power. President Rhee in the midst of the impending Korean War conflict declared a state of
emergency.57
But in the course of the emergency, the President used the situation to take advantage of
his political opponents and intimidate the legislature to pass laws to secure the presidential
reelection. He also forced the change of the method of election of president to a direct popular
vote, contrary to legislative opposition during martial law. After numerous power grabs during
emergencies and martial law, Rhee pushed a controversial amendment eliminating presidential
term limits. As a result, Rhee won reelection for four terms of alleged rigged elections; a military
coup resulted in decades of dictatorial rule under constitutional emergency powers. 58
Under this military dictatorship, the self-proclaimed President General Park Chung-hee
drafted a new constitution and enjoyed a “blanket power of emergency.” He declared a state of
emergency and put the country under martial law for two years from 1960-1962. When political
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opposition began to grow over his rule, he declared martial law again in 1964 under the same
premise.59 Over the course of his presidency, President Park Chung-hee passed laws censoring
speech, political discourse, and eventually suspended the activities of the legislature in the name
of emergency. However, upon Chung-hee’s retirement, the country’s freedom gradually returned
to western democracy standards.
The modern constitution, interestingly enough still has emergency powers despite many
years of abuse. Consequently, while the modern South Korean constitution acknowledges
emergency powers, it has very good reason to place checks on executive power. The checks on
power consist mostly of giving the legislative branch notification of emergency powers so that
they may end abuses. This is in keeping with the French and German tradition of legislative
oversight in terms of executive emergency power. However, the South Korean constitution is not
as expansive of encompassing as the Russian constitution in delegating power.
Under Article 75 of the constitution, it allows the president to issue decrees similar to the
French model and the U.S. model of executive signing statements but during a state of
emergency a president’s decrees can be given force of law.60 But states of emergency must be
approved by the legislature in order to be in effect. Similarly, the president must request the
legislature to declare martial law and at the legislature’s discretion, the martial law will be
terminated. Consequently, the new constitution reflects far more constrained emergency powers
but with executive and legislative involvement.
Conclusion
What makes the U.S. Constitution unusual is its subtle acknowledging of emergencies all
while it disregards outlining specific emergency powers with the exception of habeas corpus
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suspended during an a rebellion, a power reserved only to the legislature. A lack of an
emergency power doesn’t imply that it is nonexistent but instead that it should be a power
limited to a very small number of situations. The number one threat the founding fathers wanted
to avoid was the potential of an American monarchy. In fact, the focus on legislative and
executive flexibility when dealing with not just emergencies but matters in general provide a
great basis for keeping power in check.
The American Republic has survived over 200 years without an emergency power but
nonetheless has encountered a number of emergencies without any threat of dictatorial takeover.
The historical record of stability and division of power is telling of how efficient the lack of
explicit emergency powers is when dealing with potential power consolidation. In response to
potential emergencies, the executive coupled with legislative oversight have passed a number of
pieces of legislation and created a number of executive agencies to deal with emergencies despite
a constitutional mandate. The justification of the creation of these methods is outlined in the
broad language of the constitution to address issues on a case by case basis. As a result, there is a
high level of flexibility with a high level of oversight for all emergency actions.
The German model is a legislature-centric model focused on having the legislature
implement state of emergency procedures with the executive merely acting as a means to an end.
The American model is ideally focused on having both legislative and executive acting in
harmony with one another in passing and executing legislative acts. While the German model
merely expedites the process of which legislation gets passed during an emergency, the U.S.
executive can simply act in accordance with executive prerogative and address the issue
immediately. Consequently, the German legislative model is somewhat of an overabundance of
legislative authority in this regard.
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When dealing with foreign policy matters, an executive is essential because of the ease of
decision-making. Thus, an emergency like a wartime situation is best suited for an executive to
handle. The U.S. is able to use legislative acts to better define certain situations but the executive
is not prevented from simple emergency procedures. The U.S. model, however, does not go
nearly as far as the Russian model in which the executive is clearly the most powerful branch of
government and is able to bully its way into a legislative concurrence.
In comparison, the U.S. executive is explicitly barred from the type of actions unilateral
actions that are akin to quasi-legislative engagements. Youngstown Steel is a prime example of
how the U.S. executive is limited in his ability to act in accordance with an emergency while
preserving the emphasis on civil liberties that the Germanic constitutional model provides.
However, the executive is also tarnished by its ability to historically consolidate power to
accomplish goals which are repugnant in retrospect to civil liberties.
Executive orders and signing statements are some of the most broad and easiest way for
the U.S. president to implement his policies immediately. While nationwide emergencies are
fertile ground for executive orders, they are exceptionally hard to limit if abuses occur. For
instance, the legislative and judicial branches do have the power to place checks on the president
if he is acting against the interests of the constitution. But at the same time their checks are
somewhat inefficient. In analyzing the facts and the court’s ruling in Youngstown Steel, the
judicial check on the executive came in the form of a lengthy Supreme Court decision preventing
executive action. This method is burdensome and time consuming for the damaged party who
must wait for the court to render a decision all while the executive is acting upon his prerogative.
The French model is most similar to the U.S. in that the majority of emergency actions
are handled through executive decrees and legislation. However, there is a broad provision in
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place in the constitution outlining national emergencies. But even with the provision, there is
little guidance during emergencies and actions by the government supplemented with unilateral
executive action or legislation. As a result, the ultimate outcome is similar to the U.S. model with
little or no difference.
However, the problem with specific outlined constitutional provisions is the fact sensitive
nature of emergencies in general. Emergencies can take many forms which is reflective of the
problems with the modern German constitution. External and internal emergencies are
distinguished in the German constitution and a number of detail procedures of what can and
can’t be done are outlined. But in the event that the constitution did not outline provisions
dealing with an unanticipated emergency, the government’s abilities are limited and may not be
able to address the emergency effectively. For instance, the German constitution does not
characterize economic emergencies as “emergencies” in the constitutional sense. Thus, a
devastating economic depression may be just as devastating as an external threat but may not be
addressed in an effective way because of the constitutional limits.
While a 9/11 scenario in the U.S. presents a number of uncertainties and the appeal of a
German model with predictable outcomes is appealing but also inefficient. The flexibility of the
U.S. model is its greatest strength and allows the U.S. government to address a multitude of
emergencies the legislature and executive deem appropriate without being constrained to a
certain formula of solving the emergency. Consequently, despite the disadvantage of uncertainty,
the U.S. model is an appropriate and efficient means of dealing with emergencies.
Based off the American model, any recommendations to a new budding constitution in a
country such as Egypt should include some sort of acknowledgement of emergency power but
not necessarily in the form of a broad explicitly outlined provision. However, first and foremost,
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the country should have a bill of rights outlining what rights can and cannot be suspended and
for how long. In addition, there should be legislative and executive flexibility when dealing with
emergencies and constitutional powers granting them – such as the ability for an executive to
issue the equivalent of U.S. executive orders. Broad emergency provisions should be avoided to
avoid a Weimer Republic situation where despite legislative oversight; power can be easily
consolidated and taken advantage of by an executive.
While a broad emergency provision does not entail abuse, like in the French Model, the
potential is always there and it is best to avoid that situation all together. The histories of various
countries inevitably reveal the danger of emergency power. Therefore, in balancing the interests
of freedom and security, a new constitution should err on the side of caution by outlining a
specific bill of rights but not to the point of inefficiency such as in the modern German model.
Consequently, a joint possession of broad powers by an executive and legislature in an ad hoc
manner with an emphasis on flexibility on a case by case basis is the best means of addressing
emergencies.
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